

# **M 6.4 and M 7.1 Ridgecrest, CA Earthquakes** VIRTUAL ASSESSMENT STRUCTURAL TEAM (VAST) REPORT



Damaged mobile home in Ridgecrest, CA during the M 6.4 earthquake. Photo by Darla A. Baker / The Californian.



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# **Executive Summary**

A magnitude 6.4 earthquake with a depth of 10.7 km occurred in San Bernardino County, CA on July 4, 2019. The epicenter was located 12 km south west of Searles Valley. On July 5, 2019, a 7.1 magnitude earthquake occurred near the same location and at a depth of 17 km. It is noted that the earthquakes occurred in a fairly remote area in the Mojave Desert region of eastern California. The earthquakes were felt strongly in the China Lake-Ridgecrest area, and more broadly from Los Angeles to Las Vegas. The 6.4 magnitude earthquake was preceded by several foreshocks and followed by hundreds of aftershocks. The maximum Peak Ground Accelerations (PGA) of the 6.4 and 7.1 magnitude earthquakes were 0.38g and 0.48g, respectively. In this report, the PGA residuals are estimated using the ASK14 GMPE in terms of the number of standard deviations with respect to the median model, which correlates to structural response due to earthquake ground motions.

The impact of the two earthquakes on the city of Ridgecrest demonstrated its resiliency as it recovered rapidly where many restaurants and gas stations are back up and running. There was very little structural damage, even from the second stronger earthquake of M 7.1, except for the typically vulnerable buildings (e.g. unreinforced masonry structures and mobile homes). However, there were substantial non-structural and content losses. Fortunately, both earthquakes occurred during a holiday weekend, which meant that schools were not in session and most offices were not operational during the events. If it had not been a holiday and these schools and office spaces would have been fully occupied or the earthquake occurred in a more urban area, fatalities/injuries due to these non-structural damages could have been larger. As a community, we have to be prepared for those scenarios as well. Once again, these two earthquakes have proven the need to improve our regulations when it comes to the design of non-structural components.

Moreover, some utilities for electricity and water distribution suffered from distress. On the other hand, transportation systems and bridges suffered none to minor damage with effective and rapid repair actions.

The other city that was impacted the most is Trona, which did not perform as resilient as Ridgecrest where the city remained dysfunctional up to the time of writing this report. There were more damaged structures, mostly from the effects of ground failure and possibly strong site response related to soft sediments. The town suffered from significant loss of water where its main water pipes fractured due to fault rupture and lateral spreads.

This report overviews the hazard characteristics of the July 4 and 5, 2019 Ridgecrest, California M 6.4 and M 7.1 earthquakes, the regulatory context and emergency response, the impacts of these earthquakes, and current conditions by collocating publicly-reported information. This Preliminary Virtual Reconnaissance Report (P-VRR) represents the first product of StEER's larger coordinated response to this event, informing and supporting other research teams seeking to learn from this disaster.



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## PVRR: Preliminary Virtual Reconnaissance Report

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# Introduction

On July 4, 2019 at approximately 10:33 am PDT, a magnitude 6.4 earthquake with a depth of 10.7 km occurred in a remote area of San Bernardino County, CA. The epicenter was located 12 km south west of Searles Valley at coordinates of 35.71°N and 117.51°W. On July 5, 2019 at 8:19 pm, approximately 34 hours after the first earthquake, a 7.1 magnitude earthquake occurred near the same location, with coordinates of 35.77°N 117.61°W. The 7.1 magnitude earthquake had a depth of 17 km. Since the events were not close to urban areas, the damage experienced by buildings and other infrastructure was not extensive. However, this earthquake sequence is quite important as it includes the two largest earthquakes that occurred in Southern California in the past two decades. It provides many opportunities to learn about the following, among several other useful lessons: a) the earthquake sequence characterized by two large magnitude earthquakes one day apart, and relevantly the large magnitude foreshock scenario, b) the performance and impact of the Earthquake Early Warning and ShakeAlertLA systems, c) the expected performance in future earthquakes of pre-1980 non-ductile reinforced concrete buildings, the pre-1980 soft-first story buildings, the water system infrastructure, and the telecommunications infrastructure, which were identified as four areas of seismic vulnerability by the LA Mayoral Seismic Task Force, d) the efficacy of the adopted retrofit techniques in improving structural response, e) the performance of various structures, including school buildings, hospitals, large industrial facilities, regional airports, and mobile homes, f) the significance of nonstructural damage, g) the ground motion characteristics, and h) the community resilience in terms of the duration of power outages, mobile phone network access, infrastructure repairs, etc.

StEER further hopes to use this event to exercise protocols, procedures, policies and workflows that StEER will be developing over the next year in collaboration with the wider hazards community including the Natural Hazards Engineering Research Infrastructure (NHERI) and other members of the Extreme Events Reconnaissance Consortium.

The first product of the StEER response to the 2019 Ridgecrest, California Earthquakes is this **Preliminary Virtual Reconnaissance Report (PVRR)**, which is intended to:

- 1. provide an overview of the hazard characteristics
- 2. introduce the regulatory and disaster response context for these events
- 3. summarize the preliminary reports of damage to wide-ranging infrastructure
- 4. review StEER's event strategy in response to these earthquakes
- 5. enhance situational awareness to guide subsequent missions conducted by StEER and the engineering reconnaissance community

It should be emphasized that all results herein are preliminary and based on the rapid assessment of publicly available online data within 3-4 days of these events. Damage assessments discussed herein are based largely on the judgement of the authors without access or with very preliminary and limited access to additional aerial imagery and ground-truthing.



# Earthquake Details and Tectonic Summary

On July 4, 2019 at approximately 10:33 am PDT, a magnitude 6.4 earthquake with a depth of 10.7 km occurred in a remote area of San Bernardino County, CA. The epicenter was located 12 km south west of Searles Valley at coordinates of 35.71°N and 117.51°W. On July 5, 2019 at 8:19 pm, approximately 34 hours after the first earthquake, a 7.1 magnitude earthquake occurred near the same location, with coordinates of 35.77°N 117.61°W. The 7.1 magnitude earthquake had a depth of 17 km.

The earthquakes were felt strongly in the China Lake-Ridgecrest area, and more broadly from Los Angeles to Las Vegas. The 6.4 magnitude earthquake was preceded by several foreshocks, and hundreds of aftershocks were detected after the mainshocks. USGS ShakeMap (Figure 1) indicates the maximum Peak Ground Accelerations (PGA) of the 6.4 and 7.1 magnitude earthquakes in the range of 0.2 to 0.3g and 0.7 to 0.8g, respectively. Recorded motions are in a similar range for the 6.4 magnitude earthquake, however for the 7.1 magnitude earthquake, they are on the order of 0.5g, which is less than those predicted by ShakeMap.



Figure 1. Epicenters of the two Ridgecrest earthquakes and Shakemaps [Left: M 6.4 event and right: M 7.1 event] (USGS, 2019a; USGS, 2019b)

Both earthquakes occurred as the result of shallow strike-slip faulting in the crust of the North America plate. According to the focal mechanism solutions, rupture occurred on a steeply dipping fault as the result of either right lateral (RL) slip on a plane striking NW-SE, or as left lateral (LL) slip on a plane striking SW-NE. The earthquakes were located approximately 150 km northeast of the San Andreas Fault - the major plate boundary in the region. At the locations of the earthquakes, the Pacific plate is moving to the northwest with respect to the North America plate



at a rate of approximately 48 mm/yr. The location of the earthquakes falls within the Eastern California shear zone, a region of distributed faulting associated with motion across the Pacific North America plate boundary, and an area of high seismic hazard. More detailed studies will be required to precisely identify the causative fault associated with these events, though seismic activity over the past 2 days has been occurring on two conjugate fault structures in the Airport Lake Fault Zone (USGS, 2019a; USGS, 2019b).

The earthquakes have been followed by numerous aftershocks, the largest of which was a Magnitude 5.4 earthquake 16 hours after the M 6.4 event. Most aftershocks align in a SW-NE trend around the M 6.4 earthquake, though some also align on a NW-SE trend. The M 6.4 event was also preceded by a series of foreshocks over the previous hour, including a magnitude 4.0 event about 30 mins earlier.

## **Historical Context**

This region of eastern California has hosted numerous moderate sized earthquakes. Over the past 40 years, 8 other earthquakes, with magnitudes 5 or larger, have occurred within 50 km of the July 4th, 2019 earthquake. Figure 2 provides a timeline of historical earthquakes in California since 1900. The largest earthquake that took place close to the fault that produced the July 4th and 5th events in the last four decades prior to these two recent events was a magnitude 5.8 event on September 20, 1995, about 13 km to the west-northwest of the July 4th earthquake (USGS, 2019a; USGS, 2019b).

California is a seismically active region that has seen several major earthquakes in recent history. In 1906 The Great San Francisco Earthquake struck the bay area causing great material and human losses. On June 29th, 1925, a M 6.8 earthquake struck in the vicinity of Santa Barbara. As a consequence of this event the Pacific Building Official Conference (currently the International Conference of Building Officials) adopted the Uniform Building Code.

In 1933 the city of Long Beach felt a destructive earthquake, which caused 15 schools in the area to collapse and damaged many more structures. Almost forty years later, in 1971, a M 6.5 earthquake struck the San Fernando Valley. Because of the earthquake, 64 people lost their lives, over 2000 were injured and damage was estimated at \$500+ million. The M 6.9 Loma Prieta earthquake on October 17, 1989 led to 63 deaths, 3757 people injured and over \$5.6 billion in damage. In 1994, the M 6.7 Northridge earthquake led to 57 deaths, over 8700 people injured and economic losses between \$13 and \$40 billion.





Figure 2. Timeline of major earthquakes in California in the 20th and 21st centuries<sup>1</sup>

# **Recorded Ground Motions**

For both the M 6.4 and M 7.1 events, ground motions were recorded at several stations. In both cases, the maximum recorded Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) was recorded at the Christmas Canyon China Lake station (code CCC). For the M 6.4 event, the PGA was 369 cm/s<sup>2</sup> (0.38g) and Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) was 27 cm/s according to the Center for Engineering Strong Motion Data (CESMD) database. For the M 7.1 event, the recorded PGA was 470 cm/s<sup>2</sup> (0.48g) and PGV was 55.1 cm/s. Figure 3(a) shows the acceleration time series of the ground motions recorded at the CCC stations for the M 6.4 event and Figure 3(b) shows the same for the M 7.1 event.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> <u>https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/search/</u>





Figure 3. Acceleration time histories recorded at the Christmas Canyon China lake (CCC) station from (a) M 6.4 event and (b) M 7.1 event

Figure 4 shows the PGA vs Distance plots for all the recorded ground motions for both events. The plot shows that beyond a distance of 40 km, the PGA values were less than 0.1g for the foreshock but for the main shock even beyond 100 km, PGA greater than 0.1g has been recorded. In general, higher PGAs were recorded for longer distance for the M 7.1 event. This is consistent with the reports of shaking felt throughout the state.

Response spectra (5% damped) of the two horizontal components and the vertical component of the ground motion with the largest PGA, at the Christmas Canyon China Lake station (code CCC), are shown in Figure 5. The highest spectral acceleration for this station is computed to be 1.17g at about 0.48 sec period for the M 6.4 event, Figure 5(a). For the M 7.1 event, Figure 5(b), the maximum spectral acceleration was computed as 1.69g at about 0.11 sec period. Long period effect was observed in the response spectra of the mainshock.





Figure 4. Maximum horizontal ground motion versus distance compared with Boore & Atkinson (2008) Ground Motion Prediction Equation (GMPE) for (a) M 6.4 event and (b) M 7.1 event where distance is fault distance if available, otherwise epicentral distance<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> https://strongmotioncenter.org/graphtest/?iqrid=ci38443183

![](_page_9_Picture_3.jpeg)

![](_page_10_Figure_0.jpeg)

Figure 5. 5% damped response spectra at the CCC station for the (a) M 6.4 event and (b) M 7.1 event (Source: X. Lu, Tsinghua University & also similar to that reported in the CESMD database<sup>3</sup>)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> https://strongmotioncenter.org/NCESMD/data/ci38443183/ciccc.gif

![](_page_10_Picture_3.jpeg)

### **PGA** Residuals

PGA residuals are estimated using the ASK14 GMPE (Abrahamson *et al.*, 2014), in terms of the number of standard deviations (i.e. epsilon) with respect to the median model. The variable epsilon has been shown to be correlated to structural response for mathematical models subjected to earthquake ground motions (Baker and Cornell, 2008), hence it is deemed appropriate for the purpose of this report. Equation 1 defines the variable epsilon as follows:

$$\varepsilon(T) = \frac{\ln(Sa(T)) - \ln(\mu(T))}{\sigma \ln(T)} \tag{1}$$

where Sa(T) is the measured spectral acceleration at the structural period T,  $\mu(T)$  is the median model prediction, and  $\sigma ln(T)$  is the GMPE total standard deviation. Data for PGA was obtained from the USGS event pages (USGS, 2019a; USGS, 2019b). According to Equation 1, positive  $\varepsilon$ values indicate that the model underpredicts the observations. Figure 6 shows the relative location of the stations (red markers) with respect to the events epicenters (black stars). For the estimation of the median ground motion prediction model, a Vs30 = 360 m/s is selected for this preliminary report. Figure 7 shows the stations superimposed on the slope-based Vs30 map of California.

![](_page_11_Figure_4.jpeg)

Figure 6. Stations location of the two Ridgecrest earthquakes and Shakemaps for (a) M 6.4 event and (b) M 7.1 event

![](_page_11_Picture_6.jpeg)

![](_page_12_Figure_0.jpeg)

Figure 7. Stations locations superimposed on the slope-based Vs30 map of California

Figure 8 presents epsilon values versus distance for PGA of the two events. At the closer distance range (e.g.,  $R \le 50$  km), the median PGA is estimated by the GMPE without much bias ( $|\varepsilon(T)| \le 0.1$ ) for both event magnitudes. In the distance range  $100 \le R \le 250$  km, the median recorded PGA is larger than the median model, but with a small bias ( $\varepsilon(T) \le 0.8$ ) for the M 6.4 event. On the other hand, for the M 7.1 event, the median model agrees with the median recorded data. For the larger distance range (e.g.,  $R \ge 400$  km), the observations are larger than the median model by approximately one standard deviation, which is consistent with the observations in Figure 4.

![](_page_12_Picture_3.jpeg)

![](_page_13_Figure_0.jpeg)

Figure 8. Epsilon of PGA versus distance, based on the ASK14 ground motion model [Left: M 6.4 event and right: M 7.1 event]

![](_page_13_Picture_2.jpeg)

# Local Codes and Construction Practices

Design of new buildings in California is based on the California Building Code. One of the notable regulations in Southern California is the LA Non-Ductile Reinforced Concrete Ordinance, which requires mandatory retrofits of reinforced concrete construction. A 4-page brochure developed by the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research (PEER) Center in Collaboration with California Seismic Safety Commission (CSSC) summarizing, in simplified terms, the expected earthquake performance of buildings designed to the California building code can be found in Appendix A of this report.

The California Building Code has seen distinct improvements after each major earthquake. For example, after the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, seismic detailing was introduced for reinforced concrete members to increase ductility and energy dissipation capacity. Similarly, after the 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes, there were improvements related to soft-story wood frame buildings and welded steel connections. July 4 and 5 earthquakes also have the potential to lead to changes in the code, such as the consideration of large aftershocks and a variety of earthquake consequences in seismic design and reinforcing the ongoing efforts towards changing the code objectives from life safety to community resilience.

Table 1 provides the distribution of housing units by year of construction in San Bernardino County and the city of Ridgecrest, the most heavily impacted areas. This is based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (Bureau, 2018). Such information adds context to building performance relative to code changes. It can be seen from the table that 47.4% and 53.7% of building stock in San Bernardino County and Ridgecrest City, respectively, was constructed prior to 1980; i.e. about half the building stock lacks seismic details. The percentage of seismically retrofitted structures among this deficient building stock is not currently available.

![](_page_14_Picture_4.jpeg)

Table 1. Distribution of housing units by year of construction in San Bernardino County and the city of Ridgecrest (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (Bureau, 2018))

Time Period	San Bernardino County, CA	Ridgecrest, CA
Built 2014 or later	0.50%	0.00%
Built 2010 to 2013	1.50%	1.40%
Built 2000 to 2009	14.80%	5.90%
Built 1990 to 1999	13.10%	8.20%
Built 1980 to 1989	22.80%	30.80%
Built 1970 to 1979	17.50%	29.40%
Built 1960 to 1969	10.70%	10.20%
Built 1950 to 1959	11.50%	10.90%
Built 1940 to 1949	4.00%	1.60%
Built 1939 or earlier	3.70%	1.60%
Total Housing Units	711,900	12,534

![](_page_15_Picture_2.jpeg)

# Federal, State and Local Response

Post-earthquake responses by federal, state and municipalities, including Ridgecrest, Trona and Los Angeles, are presented below.

### Federal Response

United States President Trump tweeted about the 4th of July 2019 California earthquake. His post on Twitter on the same day of the seismic event expressed that the situation seems to be under control. On July 5th, 2019 Federal Emergency Management Agency delivered a tractor-trailer with water bottles to San Bernardino County due to the damage in the water lines<sup>4</sup>.

### State Response

- On July 4, 2019 California Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency for Kern County and expressed that officials are monitoring the aftershocks<sup>5</sup>.
- On July 5th, 2019 Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency for San Bernardino County after the M 7.1 earthquake due to conditions of "extreme peril to the safety of persons and property"<sup>6</sup>.
- Mark Ghilarducci, the Director of the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), said that there were no reported deaths or serious injuries<sup>7</sup>.
- The State's Office of Emergency Services (OES), confirmed that the OES would provide fire and rescue resources to the affected region<sup>8</sup>.

### Local Response

- Ridgecrest's Mayor Peggy Breeden declared a state of emergency. Authorities did not report serious injuries or deaths, but fires, cracked roads, and minor injuries were reported<sup>9</sup>.
- Ridgecrest Regional Hospital was evacuated for evaluation by state inspectors and as a preventive measure due to aftershocks<sup>10</sup>.
- The Red Cross established evacuation centers in Ridgecrest.
- On July 5th 2019, Los Angeles Department of Water declared that qualified personnel were surveying the aqueduct and reservoirs according to their standard earthquake response protocol. Critical facilities were also being inspected. They declared no damages were reported at that time<sup>11</sup>.
- According to the pronouncement of the Chief of San Bernardino County Fire Department,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-earthquake-california-shake-quake-20190704-story.html

![](_page_16_Picture_23.jpeg)

12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> <u>https://abc7.com/state-of-emergency-in-san-bernardino-co-after-ridgecrest-quake/5381855/</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> <u>https://abcnews.go.com/US/powerful-aftershocks-shake-southern-california-massive-earthquake-panic/story?id=64147691</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> <u>https://abc7.com/state-of-emergency-in-san-bernardino-co-after-ridgecrest-quake/5381855/</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> <u>https://abcnews.go.com/US/powerful-aftershocks-shake-southern-california-massive-earthquake-panic/story?id=64147691</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> <u>https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/07/05/aftershocks-rattle-california-after-magnitude-earthquake/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.9c300804d773</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> <u>https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/07/05/aftershocks-rattle-california-after-magnitude-earthquake/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.cb2f92d75a8c</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> <u>https://www.cnn.com/us/live-news/earthquake-california-july-2019/index.html</u>

Bill Villarino, most of Trona suffered minor to moderate damage. Typical damage consisted of collapsed chimneys, mobile homes shaken off their supports and some water main breaks, including two main lines. Villarino stated that there were no injuries<sup>12</sup>.

• After the M 6.4 earthquake, three important cracks formed across State Route 178 near Trona. They were temporarily repaired soon after the seismic event<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-trona-earthquake-20190705-story.html

![](_page_17_Picture_4.jpeg)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> <u>https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-trona-earthquake-20190705-story.html</u>

# Impacts

## Loss of Life and Injuries

The PAGER (Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response) product of the USGS is an automated system that produces content concerning the estimated impact of significant earthquakes around the world, informing emergency responders, government and aid agencies, and the media of the scope of the potential disaster. PAGER rapidly assesses earthquake impacts by comparing the population exposed to each level of shaking intensity with models of economic and fatality losses based on past earthquakes in each country or region of the world (USGS, 2019a & 2019b).

PAGER produces rough estimates of the probability density functions of the number of fatalities and economic losses in U.S. dollars. More specifically, these approximate probability density functions provide estimates of the probabilities of the order of magnitude of the number of fatalities and economic losses by providing probabilities within specific ranges each varying an order of magnitude from the previous one. The number of shaking-related fatalities in this event was projected as relatively low according to the USGS (Figures 9(a) and 10(a)) compared to previous earthquakes with similar magnitude. For both earthquakes, the USGS PAGER tool (Figures 9(b) and 10(b)) estimated no fatalities and 1 to 10 fatalities with probabilities of 65% and 30%, respectively. At the time of the writing of this report, there were no fatalities. For the 6.4 magnitude earthquake, PAGER estimated economic losses due to damage to be between \$1 million and \$10 million, between \$10 million and \$100 million, and between \$100 million and \$1,000 million with probabilities of 27%, 35%, and 21%, respectively. For the 7.1 magnitude earthquake, these probabilities were 23%, 35%, and 25%. Similarity of these two sets of estimates for the two earthquakes despite their significant differences in magnitude is worth exploring. One reason is the low population density in the epicentral region, and the relatively distant location from large urban centers.

PAGER reported that some damage is possible and the impact would be relatively localized. Estimated economic losses are less than 1% of GDP of the United States. Past events with this alert level have required a local or regional level response. It should be noted that these economic loss estimates are characterized by even larger variabilities than those in their estimates of the number of fatalities.

![](_page_18_Figure_5.jpeg)

Figure 9. PAGER Estimated probability of (a) fatalities and (b) economic losses for the July 4th, 2019 Ridgecrest, California Earthquake (USGS, 2019a)

![](_page_18_Picture_7.jpeg)

![](_page_19_Figure_0.jpeg)

Figure 10. PAGER Estimated probability of (a) fatalities and (b) economic losses for the July 5th, 2019 Ridgecrest, California Earthquake (USGS, 2019b)

### **Buildings**

### **Critical Facilities**

Based on most images and reports of damage at Ridgecrest Hospital, it has been evacuated predominantly as a precautionary measure<sup>14</sup>. "Ridgecrest Regional Hospital was evacuated so an engineer could assess whether it had structural damage," according to Ridgecrest police Capt. Justin Dampier. According to OSHPD, they inspected the hospital and did not require evacuation. At the time of authoring this report, Kern County Fire Department (KCFD) reported at least 15 patients were moved to the Ridgecrest High School gymnasium due to "structure" damage at the hospital<sup>15</sup>. Authorities also stated that about 15 patients were moved to other emergency rooms<sup>16</sup>. Those who were evacuated were sheltering in place under shade awnings and trees, while the 15 emergency room patients were taken to Palmdale-Lancaster area. There was no estimate on how many people in total were evacuated from the hospital<sup>17</sup>. "There was some structural damage at the hospital, including leaking sprinklers," a fire battalion chief said at an afternoon news conference. Some reports indicated that a building inspector was examining the damage. The hospital was reported 100% functional again on July 7th.

### **Commercial Construction**

During the two earthquakes, many unsecured objects fell from shelves (Figures 11 to 13). Inside convenience stores aisles were flooded with broken liquor bottles and food items that had fallen off the shelves. There was also light to moderate non-structural component damage, such as collapse of suspended ceilings tiles/grids, concrete, glass and masonry facades, etc. (Figures 14 and 15). As with residential construction covered in the next section, several commercial masonry structures experienced various degrees of damage, Figure 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> https://ktla.com/2019/07/04/ridgecrest-hospital-evacuated-after-magnitude-6-4-earthquake-hits-nearby/

![](_page_19_Picture_11.jpeg)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> <u>https://www.ridgecrestca.com/news/20190705/breeden-declares-state-of-emergency-following-earthquake</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> <u>https://www.visaliatimesdelta.com/story/news/2019/07/04/earthquake-centered-kern-county-rattles-visalia-tulare/1650393001/</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> <u>https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/6-4-magnitude-earthquake-shakes-southern-california-</u> n1026621

![](_page_20_Picture_0.jpeg)

Figure 11. Items knocked from the shelves inside State Bros. Markets in Ridgecrest, California after the M 6.4 event (Source: CNN, 2019)

![](_page_20_Picture_2.jpeg)

Figure 12. Books cover the floor at a Kern County Library in Ridgecrest after the 6.4 magnitude event (Credit: Richard Wagner, Source: KTLA, 2019)

![](_page_20_Picture_4.jpeg)

![](_page_21_Picture_0.jpeg)

Figure 13. Broken bottles and other goods in a store in Lake Isabella after the magnitude 6.4 earthquake<sup>18</sup>

![](_page_21_Picture_2.jpeg)

Figure 14. (a) The Daily Independent Newspaper office ceiling damaged during the M 6.4 event (Jessica Watson, AP); (b) Suspended ceiling partial failure at a laundromat in Ridgecrest after the M 6.4 event (Photo by Terry Pierson, The Press-Enterprise/SCNG)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> <u>https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/6-4-quake-hits-Mojave-Desert-felt-in-Los-Angeles-</u>14071924.php#photo-17804993

![](_page_21_Picture_5.jpeg)

![](_page_22_Picture_0.jpeg)

Figure 15. (a) Fallen concrete panels at a building in North Ridgecrest (Source: Karen Húa via Twitter); (b) Glass facade damage in retail building due to M 6.4 event (Source: AP)

![](_page_22_Picture_2.jpeg)

# Figure 16. Cracks in masonry walls in Trona following the M 7.1 event (Photo by Christine Goulet, SCEC)

#### **Residential Construction**

At least two residential houses in Ridgecrest caught fire after the M 6.4 event most probably due to broken gas pipes. One house on the corner of Sunland Street and East California Avenue had the garage and part of the main roof burnt by fire (Figure 17a). Another house was heavily damaged by fire, after the M 6.4 event (Figure 17b). Figure 18a shows a collapsed chimney and the upper brick layers that fell from a masonry wall. A house was damaged with diagonal and vertical cracks in exterior walls (Figure18b). Other buildings with failed chimneys or damaged walls are shown in Figures 19 to 24. Many unreinforced masonry chimney failures were observed in Trona after the M 7.1 event. Preliminary reports cite significant damage in Trona after the M 7.1, pending more information from field teams. Typical damage to timber framed homes is shown in Figure 22, while damage to items in a cafeteria named "My Enchanted Cottage" at 214 W Ridgecrest Blvd Ridgecrest, CA 93555, are shown in Figure 25.

![](_page_22_Picture_6.jpeg)

![](_page_23_Picture_0.jpeg)

(a)

(b)

Figure 17. Two houses caught fire in Ridgecrest after the M 6.4 event (San Bernandino Sun, 2019; AP News, 2019)

![](_page_23_Picture_4.jpeg)

(a) Collapse of a chimney and upper section of a masonry wall

![](_page_23_Picture_6.jpeg)

![](_page_23_Picture_7.jpeg)

(b) Cracks in exterior walls (c) Fire damage after M 7.1 event Figure 18. Damage to masonry structures (Sources: (a) Reuters, 2019; (b) Yahoo, 2019, and (c) <u>themegaagency</u>, Instagram, 2019)

![](_page_23_Picture_9.jpeg)

![](_page_24_Picture_0.jpeg)

Figure 19. A cinderblock wall partially destroyed in Ridgecrest following the magnitude 7.1 Earthquake (CNN, 2019)

![](_page_24_Picture_2.jpeg)

Figure 20. Damage to a masonry house in Trona after the M 7.1 earthquake (Source: Eytan Wallace via Twitter)

![](_page_24_Picture_4.jpeg)

![](_page_25_Picture_0.jpeg)

Figure 21. Damage to a masonry houses in Trona after the M 7.1 earthquake (Sources:a) Rob Mcmillan via Twitter, b) CBS Los Angeles)

![](_page_25_Picture_2.jpeg)

![](_page_26_Picture_0.jpeg)

Figure 22. (a) Damaged house in Trona after the M 7.1 event (credit: Mario Tama, AFP); (b) Damaged walls of a home in Trona (Source: @23ABCNews via Twitter)

![](_page_26_Picture_2.jpeg)

Figure 23. Collapsed cinder block walls of a masonry house (Source: Karen Hua viaTwitter)

![](_page_26_Picture_4.jpeg)

![](_page_27_Picture_0.jpeg)

Figure 24. Broken masonry chimney and damaged masonry walls (Source: <u>Ken O'Doll</u> via Twitter)

![](_page_27_Picture_2.jpeg)

Figure 25. Contents damage in a cafeteria due to the M 6.4 event (AP News, 2019)

At least two mobile homes were damaged during the M 6.4 event. One is at Trousdale Estates at 210 W. Ward Ave. in Ridgecrest where a woman and her child were inside the building when the earthquake occurred but were unharmed, Figure 26(a). The mobile home appears to have been displaced off its supports, resulting in damage to the skirt surrounding the trailer chassis. Another mobile home also appears to have fallen off its supports resulting in damage to the metal columns supporting the roof over the porch, Figure 26(b). Out of 193 mobile homes in three mobile home parks north of Ridgecrest, eight mobile homes collapsed; none of which were tied down or had seismic braces (Keith Porter from the field.) It appears that most of these collapses were due to the M 7.1 event. According to Jonathan Stewart from the field: there are damaged structures in Trona, in many cases this is from the effects of ground failure. Following the M 7.1 event, Trona seems to be largely abandoned, due to loss of water (it is served by the water pipes ruptured by

![](_page_27_Picture_5.jpeg)

fault rupture). Only police and utility personnel present in the area. Unlike Trona, Ridgecrest experienced little structural damage except in especially vulnerable structures, significant content and non-structural damage.

![](_page_28_Picture_1.jpeg)

Figure 26. Damage to mobile homes in Ridgecrest area due to the M 6.4 event (a) Source: Bakersfield News, 2019; (b) Source: Yahoo News, 2019

### Schools

At the time of authoring this report, there were no available reports or articles indicating significant damage to local schools. A Fourth of July performance was taking place at Burroughs High School when the M 6.4 earthquake hit, which was documented in a video posted to Twitter (Figure 27, Fox26News, 2019). Since Burroughs High School had back-up generators, they were able to keep the air conditioning operational despite disruption of power elsewhere. Burroughs High School served as a cooling center, allowing people to gather in the gymnasium and stay cool during the day. The American Red Cross later set up an evacuation center at Burroughs High. Ridgecrest High School similarly had individuals temporarily shelter in their gymnasium -- KCFD reported that at least 15 patients from Ridgecrest Regional Hospital were moved there due to potential damage.

![](_page_28_Picture_5.jpeg)

![](_page_29_Picture_0.jpeg)

Figure 27. Fourth of July performance taking place at Burroughs High School during the M 6.4 earthquake; screen capture from video recorded by Yari Mower (AOL, 2019)

#### **Instrumented Structures**

Tables 2 and 3 report the recorded peak structural acceleration (PSA) at the instrumented structures in descending order for the M 6.4 and M 7.1 events, respectively. Stations with PSA greater than 0.05g are listed in the tables. The highest peak acceleration (0.29g) was recorded at a 3-story office building at Lancaster for the M 6.4 event. The same building also recorded significant shaking (PSA = 0.326g) during the M 7.1 event. At the time of writing this report, no information on structural or non-structural damage was available for the above mentioned building. Significant shaking has also been recorded for both events at Hwy 395/Brown Road Bridge at Ridgecrest (0.27g for the M 6.4 and 0.6g for the M 7.1 events). Based on preliminary field investigation<sup>19</sup>, no damage was visible from this field assessment after the M 6.4 event. Interestingly, the highest peak structural acceleration for the M 7.1 event was recorded 230 km away from the epicenter at the Port of Long Beach (1.29g). Furthermore, 10 story residential building at Burbank, situated about 180 km away from the epicenter, experienced strong shaking during both events recording 0.22g and 0.30g for M 6.4 and M 7.1 events, respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> This field investigation was conducted on July 5th, 2019 by Prof. Farzin Zareian, UCI.

![](_page_29_Picture_5.jpeg)

Station Name	Network	Code	Distance (km)	PSA (g)
Lancaster - 3-story Office Bldg.	CGS	24517	127.6	0.291
Lancaster - 5-story Hospital	CGS	24609	127.6	0.275
Ridgecrest - Hwy 395/Brown Road Bridge	CGS	33742	28.6	0.274
Burbank - 10-story Residential Bldg.	CGS	24385	183.8	0.221
Palmdale - 5-story Hospital	CGS	24457	137.4	0.120
Redlands - 1-story Warehouse	CGS	23495	183.8	0.074
San Bernardino - 5-story Hospital	CGS	23634	175.4	0.063
Los Angeles - 9-story Univ Hospital Bldg.	CGS	24260	193.1	0.062
San Bernardino - 6-story Hotel	CGS	23287	183.1	0.057
Los Angeles - 7-story Hospital	CGS	24397	192.2	0.054
Los Angeles - 52-story Office Bldg.	CGS	24602	196.0	0.053
Pasadena; Millikan Library	NSMP	5407	183.0	0.052
Palmdale - Hwy 14/Barrel Springs Bridge	CGS	24706	140.6	0.050
Riverside - 6-story Hospital	CGS	13633	192.2	0.050

 Table 2. Peak acceleration recorded at instrumented structures during the M 6.4 event (Source: CESMD database)

![](_page_30_Picture_2.jpeg)

Station Name	Network	Code	Distance (km)	PSA (g)
Long Beach - Port of LB Pier T	CGS	14412	230.3	1.290
Ridgecrest - Hwy 395/Brown Road Bridge	CGS	33742	22.1	0.605
Lancaster - 3-story Office Bldg.	CGS	24517	129.9	0.326
Burbank - 10-story Residential Bldg.	CGS	24385	186.7	0.300
Lancaster - Airport Control Tower	CGS	24474	126.8	0.236
Palmdale - 5-story Hospital	CGS	24457	140.2	0.143
San Bernardino - 5-story Hospital	CGS	23634	183.2	0.123
Riverside - 6-story Hospital	CGS	13633	199.7	0.119
San Bernardino - 5-story CSUSB Library	CGS	23285	177.6	0.087
Los Angeles - 8-story County Med Ofc Bld	CGS	24249	197.4	0.077
Palmdale - Hwy 14/Barrel Springs Bridge	CGS	24706	143.6	0.074
Irvine - 6-story Hospital	CGS	13439	234.4	0.071
Los Angeles - 52-story Office Bldg.	CGS	24602	199.5	0.069
Los Angeles - 7-story Hospital	CGS	24397	195.5	0.065
Los Angeles - 9-story Office Bldg.	CGS	24579	200.3	0.065
Los Angeles - 8-story CSULA Admin. Bldg.	CGS	24468	195.5	0.063
Palm Springs - 4-story Hospital	CGS	12299	235.0	0.062
Los Angeles - 19-story Office Bldg.	CGS	24643	203.4	0.054
Pasadena - 9-story Commercial Bldg.	CGS	24571	186.4	0.050
Los Angeles - 9-story Univ Hospital Bldg.	CGS	24260	196.8	0.050

 Table 3. Peak acceleration recorded at instrumented structures during the M 7.1 event (Source: CESMD database)

### Fire Following Earthquake

### M 6.4 Earthquake - July 4, 2019

The M 6.4 earthquake caused two structural fires, a brush fire, and a few vegetation fires. This section will focus on the fires caused in structures. The structural fires occurred in Ridgecrest, CA and in Bakersfield, CA and were reported by the Kern County Fire Department. It is unknown at the time as to the cause of the fires, but multiple gas leaks were also reported after the earthquake. Figure 28(a) shows an active fire in Ridgecrest and Figure 28(b) shows the post-fire

![](_page_31_Picture_5.jpeg)

condition of the house. Figure 29 shows the Bakersfield Fire Department notification of the active fire in Bakersfield after the M 6.4 event.

![](_page_32_Picture_1.jpeg)

Figure 28. Fire following M 6.4 event in Ridgecrest (a) active fire conditions (ABC, 2019), and (b) post-fire condition (Source: San Bernardino Sun, 2019)

![](_page_32_Picture_3.jpeg)

# Figure 29. Fire following M 6.4 event in Bakersfield (Source: Bakersfield Fire Department Facebook Page)

Fire departments must respond to all gas leaks with the code of "structural fire." Therefore, through the Kern County Fire Department (KCFD) incident reporter, these locations can be determined. There were three reports of gas leaks in Bakersfield due to the M 6.4 event. These are shown as structural fires and the exact locations are provided in the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) Virtual Earthquake Reconnaissance Team (VERT) report that is included in Appendix B of this report.

### M 7.1 Earthquake - July 5, 2019

There were 14 structural fire responses by the KCFD within about 12 hours after the earthquake. While all of these may not be earthquake related, these are mapped below, and exact locations

![](_page_32_Picture_8.jpeg)

are provided in the VERT report included in the appendix of this report. A map of the locations of both the M 6.4 and M 7.1 KCFD responses for structural fires are shown in maps in Figure 30 where these locations were concentrated in Bakersfield and Ridgecrest. A link to the Google Map is provided in the VERT report included in Appendix B of this report.

![](_page_33_Figure_1.jpeg)

Figure 30. Distribution of structural fire responses by the KCFD after the two earthquakes; purple indicates M 6.4 responses and orange indicates M 7.1 responses, (a) in Bakersfield, and (b) in Ridgecrest

### Lifelines

The M 6.4 Ridgecrest earthquake generated minor damage to lifelines, including some cracks on 178 Highway, localized water breaks, and limited damage to the electric infrastructure. The majority of the damage was quickly repaired by the responsible agencies. The areas affected by lifelines damage were the town of Trona and Ridgecrest. The M 7.1 event created more significant damage than the M 6.4 one, generating several cracks on the SR 178 and rockslides.

### **Transportation Infrastructure and Bridges**

A large crack has formed in a highway near Ridgecrest following the earthquake event on July 4, 2019. The road damage included a 12-inch (305 mm) crack across Highway 178, about two miles west of Trona Road. Moreover, several cracks formed on the SR 178 between Trona and Ridgecrest after the M 7.1 event. The roads have been closed for repairs and were quickly repaired by Caltrans crews (KTLA, 2019, Figures 31 to 33). After the M 6.4 event, highways in San Bernardino County remained open. However, after the M 7.1 event, the SR 178 between Trona and Ridgecrest was closed for repairs. No damage to bridges and airports was reported.

![](_page_33_Picture_7.jpeg)

![](_page_34_Picture_0.jpeg)

Figure 31. Damage reported in Highway 178 (a) Large crack formed near Trona<sup>20</sup> (b) a motorcyclist rides over a temporarily repaired part of the damaged highway in Ridgecrest one day after the earthquake, demonstrating the rapid response of repair crews; (c) damage reported in Ridgecrest during the M 6.4 event<sup>21</sup>; (d) surface cracks near Ridgecrest following the M 6.4 event<sup>22</sup> (AP Photo/David McNew) (e) Crack length near Ridgecrest after the July 4th event<sup>23</sup>; (f) rockslides cause closure of the highway from the M 7.1 event on Friday night; announced clear Saturday at 1 AM by Kern Country<sup>24</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-trona-earthquake-batters-rockslides-ridgecrest-20190705-story.html

![](_page_34_Picture_7.jpeg)

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> <u>https://ktla.com/2019/07/04/6-6-earthquake-jolts-southern-california-on-4th-of-july/</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> https://www.facebook.com/nextquake/photos/rpp.1522642377960072/2878715709019392/?type=3&theater

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> <u>https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-quake/big-quake-rattles-area-of-20-million-people-in-california-no-one-killed-idUSKCN1TZ1VB</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> <u>https://www.facebook.com/USGeologicalSurvey/</u>

![](_page_35_Picture_0.jpeg)

Figure 32. A road in Trona slightly damaged during M 6.4 event (AP Photo/M. Hartman<sup>25</sup>)

![](_page_35_Picture_2.jpeg)

Figure 33. (a) Several cracks on the SR 178 WS between Trona and Ridgecrest after the M 7.1 event. The road was closed for repairs; (b) Details of the cracks<sup>26</sup>; (c) Other picture of the cracks<sup>27</sup>; (d) Rockfall cleared on SR 178 between Trona and Ridgecrest but route still closed for temporary repair<sup>28</sup>

An assessment of the bridges instrumented for strong motion by the California Department of Transportation. Bridge Number 50-0340 at Brown Road, Figure 34(a), was instrumented for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> https://heavy.com/news/2019/07/trona-earthquake-damage-photos/

![](_page_35_Picture_9.jpeg)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/6-4-magnitude-earthquake-shakes-southern-california-n1026621

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> https://twitter.com/Caltrans8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> https://heavy.com/news/2019/07/trona-earthquake-damage-photos/
strong motion and was triggered by this earthquake, Figure 34(b). It is located about 14 miles from the epicenter of this earthquake. The California Geological Survey (CGS) personnel processed the data and send it to Caltrans for emergency use. Typically, a default filter of three seconds is used to filter strong motion records, but with the long period energy associated with this earthquake, a 10 second corner period was utilized. The ground sensors show a peak acceleration of 0.24g and the structure recorded 0.60g (refer to Figure 35). The structure experienced long motions of 116 mm transversely and 152 mm longitudinally (refer to Figure 36). Comparing the wave forms from the top and bottom of the column, they show that they move together and should have no relative deflection. Thus, from this preliminary investigation, no cracks are expected of the columns of this bridge.

A structure having a long period of natural vibration (e.g. 6 sec) such as a tall building or large bridge (e.g. Vincent Thomas) would have experienced great motion (harmonic vibration). Since this bridge structure of Brown Road and the local buildings have a high natural frequency of vibration, they basically moved with the ground. If this epicenter was under a large city, many structures would experience greater displacements. It is indeed fortunate that these two big events occurred in a rural area.

Another interesting observation is that the free field vertical spectral acceleration (Sa) is almost 4g at 0.4 seconds (refer to Figure 37). Because of the magnitude of the two events, many ground stations, bridges, buildings and geotechnical downhole arrays were triggered and data is available<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> <u>https://strongmotioncenter.org/cgi-bin/CESMD/iqr\_dist\_DM2.pl?ID=ci38457511</u>





Ridgecrest - Hwy 395/Brown Road Bridge Caltrans Bridge No. 50-340 (09-KER-395-R25.08) CSMIP Station No. 33742



Figure 34. Caltrans Bridge No. 50-340 of Brown Road (a) Photograph of the bridge; (b) Bridge layout and instrumentation by CSMIP





Figure 35. Measured accelerations of Bridge No. 50-340 of Brown Road during M 7.1 event (for Channel numbers, refer to Figure 34(b))





Figure 36. Computed displacement from measured accelerations of Bridge No. 50-340 of Brown Road during M 7.1 event (for Channel numbers, refer to Figure 34(b))



Ridgecrest - Hwy 395/Brown Road Bridge CGS Sta 33742 Rcrd of Fri Jul 5, 2019 20:21:11.7 ???\* Frequency Band Processed: 10.0 secs to 40.0 Hz Automated Strong Motion Processing - Preliminary and Subject to Revision

SPECTRAL ACCELERATION, Sa



# Figure 37. Computed 5% damped spectral accelerations from measured accelerations of Bridge No. 50-340 of Brown Road during M 7.1 event (for Channel numbers, refer to Figure 34(b))

### **Utilities for Electricity and Water Distribution**

Power was knocked out in Trona, Figure 38, a small town closest to the epicenter, located about 25 miles north of Ridgecrest. In addition, residents reported water main breaks and gas line breaks<sup>30</sup>. It was reported that 2,000 customers in Kern County and another 3,000 in San Bernardino and Inyo lost power after the M 7.1 event. Service had been restored quickly<sup>31</sup>. Some water pipes were damaged during the M 6.4 event. Refer to Figures 39 and 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> <u>https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/07/06/california-earthquake/?utm\_term=.60923781a92e</u>



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2019/07/04/6-6m-quake-strikes-near-ridgecrest-in-kern-county/



Figure 38. (a) A utility pole in Trona was damaged during the earthquake<sup>32</sup>; (b) Workers repair damaged utility lines in Trona, CA (AP Photo/Mario Tama | Getty Images<sup>33</sup>



Figure 39. (a) Water spews from pipes in Trona damaged by the M 6.4 event (AP Photo/Matt Hartman<sup>34</sup>; (b) A crack on Highway 178 seen during fixing a broken water line south of Trona (Source: AP Photo/F.J. BROWN | AFP/GETTY IMAGES<sup>35</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> <u>https://www.wknofm.org/post/64-magnitude-earthquake-hits-southern-california-rattling-large-swath-state</u>



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> <u>https://www.chron.com/bayarea/article/6-6-earthquake-southern-California-san-bernardino-14071882.php#photo-17806022</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> <u>https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/07/05/strongest-earthquake-in-20-years-rattles-southern-california</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> <u>https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/6-4-quake-hits-Mojave-Desert-felt-in-Los-Angeles-14071924.php#photo-17806048</u>



Figure 40. (a) Exploded water pipe reported during the M 6.4 event, consequently forming a crater near Ridgecrest (Source: AP Photo/Etienne Laurent, EPA-EFE<sup>36</sup>; (b) Crews dealing with a water main that ruptured during the earthquake<sup>37</sup>

## **Non-Structural Damage**

This event caused significant damage to non-structural elements such as infill walls, partition walls (usually built of masonry), ceilings and veneers and various types of building contents. In addition to the equipment damage shown with photographs in previous sections, there was damage to suspended ceilings, Figure 41.



Figure 41. Suspended ceiling damage at Baptist Church in Ridgecrest<sup>38</sup>

<sup>37</sup> <u>https://www.msn.com/en-us/weather/weathertopstories/64-magnitude-earthquake-hits-southern-</u> california/ss-AADRIAr?ocid=msn360#image=16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> http://www.bpnews.net/53239/calif-quakes-prompt-southern-baptist-response



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup><u>https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/local/2019/07/04/6-6-magnitude-earthquake-rattles-parts-southern-california/1650319001/</u>

## **Geotechnical Failures**

## M6.4 Earthquake - July 4, 2019

The M 6.4 earthquake caused geotechnical damage in the form of surface fault rupture, ground separation, and ground fissures. An approximately 12" wide crack was formed across Trona Road about 2.5 miles South of State Route 178 (see VERT report included in Appendix B). Another large crack was formed across State Route 178 about 2 miles West of Trona Road. Several other cracks along State Route 178 were reported by the Caltrans District 8 Twitter page; according to the same source these cracks were repaired by the Caltrans District 9 Maintenance crews within an hour after the event. According to the <u>USnews</u>, California Highway Patrol announced that overpasses and underpasses were not damaged and these cracks were primarily in the county roads.

Several traces of fault rupture and ground fissure were also reported near Ridgecrest after the earthquake. Satellite images reflected subtle left-lateral fault rupture after the M 6.4 Ridgecrest earthquake.



(a) (b) (c) Figure 42. Geotechnical damage following M6.4 Ridgecrest (a) 12" wide crack across Trona road<sup>39</sup>, (b) Caltrans District 9 Maintenance crews make repairs to cracks along SR 178 near Trona (Source: Caltrans District 8 Twitter page<sup>40</sup>), and (c) ground separation and offset (photo by Emily Guerin<sup>41</sup>). All images reported in the VERT report, Appendix B.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> https://twitter.com/guerinemily



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> https://heavy.com/news/2019/07/california-earthquake-today-map-damage-magnitude/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> https://twitter.com/Caltrans8



Figure 43. 100 ft (30.48 m) wide zone of parallel ruptures showing left lateral (LL) and some dilation along the Ridgecrest surface rupture reported by Danielle Verdugo Madugo<sup>42</sup>



(b)

(c)

(a) Figure 44. Surface Fault Rupture following M 6.4 Ridgecrest earthquake (a) Off the road rupture (reported by Emily Guerin<sup>43</sup>), (b) Ground crack near Ridgecrest<sup>44</sup>, (c) fault rupture across Randsburg Wash Road to the south of State Route 178, measured offset of approximately 1.5 feet (457 mm) (Source: Brian Olson Twitter page<sup>45</sup>). All images reported in the VERT report, Appendix B.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> https://twitter.com/mrbrianolson



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<sup>42</sup> https://twitter.com/DanielleVerdugo

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> https://twitter.com/guerinemily

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> https://www.newsweek.com/california-earthquake-viral-videos-panic-chaos-tremor-aftershock-1447699



Figure 45. (a) Lateral displacement of 100 cm; and (b) Wide distributed shears<sup>46</sup>

### M7.1 Earthquake - July 5, 2019

The M 7.1 earthquake caused geotechnical damage in the form of surface fault rupture (e.g. offset, ground fissures etc.), rockfalls, and liquefaction-induced failures (e.g. lateral spreading). A North-West trending fault rupture measured up to 6 feet (229 mm) of right-lateral offset on the China Lake NWAS base<sup>47</sup>. A right-lateral offset of about 6.5 feet (248 mm) and a vertical offset of about 3 feet (114 mm) were reported<sup>48</sup>. A surface rupture across State Route 178 caused a right-lateral offset, likely related to the North-West trending conjugate fault<sup>49</sup>, photo taken from the VERT report, Appendix B. Fault rupture also bended railroad tracks and caused damage to the nearby road; a 3-feet (114 mm) right lateral offset was reported<sup>50</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> <u>https://twitter.com/neotectonic</u>



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> <u>https://twitter.com/ChupikColin/status/1147558794148245504</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> <u>https://twitter.com/mrbrianolson</u>

<sup>48</sup> https://twitter.com/mrbrianolson

<sup>49</sup> https://twitter.com/mrbrianolson



Figure 46. (a) Aerial view of the faulted road on the China Lake NWAS base, about 6.5 feet (248 mm) right lateral (RL) and 3 feet (114 mm) vertical offset<sup>51</sup>, (b) North-West trending fault rupture measuring 6 feet (229 mm) of right-lateral offset on the China Lake NWAS base<sup>52</sup>, and (c) Bent railroad track due to the fault rupture , close to 3 feet (114 mm) of RL offset<sup>53</sup>

Multiple ground cracks along State Route 178 near Post Mile 8.5 were patched before opening the road to traffic (the duration of closure is now known at this time). According to the Caltrans District 8 Twitter page, Caltrans started permanent construction repairs on State Route 178 approximately six miles east of Ridgecrest. The repairs were done in three separate areas within four mile stretch along the State Route 178. All bridges and highway structures have been evaluated by Caltrans engineers and they have been determined safe for normal operations<sup>54</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> https://twitter.com/Caltrans8



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> https://twitter.com/mrbrianolson

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> https://twitter.com/mrbrianolson

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> https://twitter.com/neotectonic



Figure 47. Aerial views of ground failure indicating left-stepping and right-stepping lateral faults reported by lan Pierce<sup>55</sup>



Figure 48. Multiple ground cracks along SR 178 (Source: Caltrans8 Twitter page<sup>56</sup>, taken from the VERT report, Appendix B)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> https://twitter.com/Caltrans8



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> https://twitter.com/neotectonic



Figure 49. SR 178 near PM (post mile mark) 8.5 Caltrans crews making repairs to patch road before open to traffic<sup>57</sup> (picture taken 12:53am 07/06/2019)

Rockfall caused road closure in State Route 178 between Bakersfield and Lake Isabella. This road was later opened to traffic. Rockfall in State Route 178 between Trona and Ridgecrest caused traffic closure; the rockfall was later cleared. Rockfall was also reported from State Route 190 Townes Pass and State Route 127 near the Tecopas Hot Springs turnoff<sup>58</sup>.





Figure 50. Rockfall damages in Ridgecrest<sup>59</sup> (left) and Trona<sup>60</sup> (right). All images reported in the VERT report, Appendix B.

Significant geotechnical damage in Trona resulted from at depth liquefaction (Ken Hudson, personal communication) leading to lateral spreading at the surface. Few sand boils were also observed. Photos below were collected by EERI members performing field investigation after the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-trona-earthquake-batters-rockslides-ridgecres



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> https://twitter.com/Caltrans8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> https://twitter.com/Caltrans8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> https://twitter.com/neotectonic

M7.1 earthquake and shared by Kenneth Hudson (one of the EERI team members). The groundwater table in this area is reported to be fairly shallow (~1.5 ft (247 mm) according to <u>http://wdl.water.ca.gov/waterdatalibrary/</u> and nearby well data). The combination of heavy rainfall during the past winter with the lakebed could justify these observations as well as the occurrence of liquefaction (Ken Hudson, personal communication).



Figure 51. Liquefaction induced lateral spreading and sand boils causing damage to the roadway, and infrastructure in the Trona area (source for all: courtesy of Kenneth Hudson, one of EERI field investigation team members) [clockwise from top left: Esparza restaurant commercial building distance from – closest distance to Searles Lake 0.6 mile; US Post Office Building – closest distance to Searles Lake 1.0 mile; corner of California Street and Argus Avenue; Shell gas station – closest distance to Searles Lake 1.0 mile].





Figure 52. Closer look at ground failure observed at underground storage tank at Shell gas station on Trona Road (Source: courtesy of Kenneth Hudson, one of EERI field investigation team members).

# **Current Conditions, Access Restrictions and Recommendations**

There have been access restrictions to some hospitals. The Ridgecrest Regional Hospital has now reopened after being closed for a few days after both earthquake events<sup>61</sup>. As of this report, the authors are not aware of any unusual access restrictions in place.

Recommendations for further investigation may include the following:

- 1. Effect of the accumulated damage from the M 6.4 earthquake on the response during the M 7.1 earthquake,
- Evaluation of the accuracy of regional scale simulations (those of NHERI SimCenter and X. Lu Tsinghua group) by comparing their results against the observed damage,
- 3. Investigation of the current status of ShakeAlertLA. Does it require revisions, change of thresholds, etc.?
- 4. Current status of earthquake insurance in California,
- 5. Reasons behind the relatively poor performance of the water supply network despite the ongoing efforts for its improvement around the Los Angeles area, and
- 6. Further investigation of performance of non-structural components including mobile homes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> https://twitter.com/FlavioLacayo/status/1148011491984998400?s=20



# StEER Response Strategy

Based on prior event experience and preferences, StEER volunteers are generally offered positions on two types of StEER Teams:

- Virtual Assessment Structural Teams (VASTs) were formed to assemble data on the event from public sources and lead authorship of two reports: The Preliminary Virtual Assessment Structural Team (P-VAST) Report and The Early Access Reconnaissance Report (EARR) based on the data from FAST-1. VASTs also work to enrich FAST data with other information gleaned from inventory and high-resolution imagery and participate in quality assurance and data cataloging processes.
- Field Assessment Structural Teams (FASTs) were formed by invitations to individuals with prior field experience and expertise relevant to this type of event. FASTs were used to rapidly gather essential data only visible on the ground, with the understanding that these will be enriched with additional sources of data through aligned StEER efforts.

Given the magnitude of the two Ridgecrest earthquakes, StEER deployed the VAST who produced this report. However, the observed limited structural damage discussed in this report does not warrant the need to deploy a FAST at this stage. StEER will continue to monitor the situation and work with local field reconnaissance teams in case the situation changes and necessitates deploring a FAST. In this case a FAST drawn from regional expertise with prior earthquake reconnaissance experience will be sought. Typically, a FAST will gather samples of damage to buildings and other infrastructure using a combination of door-to-door (D2D) damage assessments, unmanned aerial surveys (UASs) and StreetView imagery. VAST will review damage reports and data from FAST as swiftly as possible, as well as other public data from this event, as conducted in this report. This will be used to generate an Early Action Reconnaissance Report (EARR) to be released on DesignSafe. The findings of FAST will then inform subsequent FASTs that may deploy to the affected regions.



# Appendix A: Expected Earthquake Performance of Buildings Designed to the California Building Code<sup>62</sup>

# EXPECTED EARTHQUAKE PERFORMANCE OF BUILDINGS DESIGNED TO THE CALIFORNIA BUILDING CODE

Earthquakes don't happen everyday but when they do, there are consequences to families, businesses, and communities!

What is your risk? How are you impacted after a quake? How do you want to live after an earthquake? What can you do to achieve that goal?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Brochure developed by Grace Kang of PEER and several co-authors of this report for the CSSC.



EER

# EXPECTED CODE PERFORMANCE

The California Building Code is a *minimum requirement* intended to protect *life safety* and *prevent collapse*. It *allows damage*, which means buildings may not be habitable or functional after a moderate or large earthquake.

THE BUILDING CODE ...

#### EARTHQUAKES & CODE IMPROVEMENTS

#### HAS LIFE SAFETY INTENT

the building may remain standing so you can evacuate

ALLOWS DAMAGE

you might not be allowed to re-enter a damaged building

#### IS A MINIMUM REQUIREMENT

you can choose to have your building designed or retrofitted for less damage

#### SAN FERNANDO

1971 Magnitude 6.5: 64 died, 2543 injured, \$553M damage Code improvement: Concrete detailing

#### LOMA PRIETA

1989 Magnitude 6.9: 63 died, 3757 injured, \$5.6-\$6B damage Code improvements: Wood frame soft story issues

#### NORTHRIDGE

1994 Magnitude 6.7: 57 died, 8700 injured, \$13B-\$40B damage Code improvement: Welded steel frame detailing

#### EXPECTED PERFORMANCE OF CODE-DESIGNED NEW BUILDINGS IN EARTHQUAKES

		Collapse Prevention	Life Safety	Immediate Occupancy	Operationa
ESSENTIAL BUILDINGS					
	Extreme Shaking Maximum Considered Earthquake	Likely	Likely	Unlikely	Unlikely
Examples: Hospitals, Fire Stations	Strong Shaking Design Level Earthquake	Likely	Likely	Possibly	Unlikely
ORDINARY BUILDINGS					
datante :	Extreme Shaking Maximum Considered Earthquake	Likely	Possibly	Unlikely	Unlikely
	Strong Shaking Design Level Earthquake	Likely	Likely	Unlikely	Unlikely
Examples: Houses, Apartments,					



# POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES AND YOUR RISK

MYTHS	REALITY & RISKS		
I occupy a new building, so I will be fine.	The California Building Cod intended to protect life safet earthquake, may have dam	e establishes a minimum stan y. Even a new building, follow age and be unusable.	dard ing an
My building was retrofitted last year, so I will be fine.	Most retrofitted buildings are California Building Code. E unusable after an earthqua	e not required to be fully comp ven a retrofitted building may ve.	liant with the current have damage and be
Only buildings that are compliant to current code can be occupied or sold.	Even as the California Build not be able to require existing	ing Code develops and impro ng buildings to comply with cu	ves, communities may rrent code.
My home and workplace are not located next to a fault, so I will be fine.	Different soil and site condit 1989, severe damage and o miles away from the epicent	ions can result in strong shak collapses occurred in San Frai ter of the Loma Prieta Earthqu	ing far from faults. In ncisco and Oakland, 60 Jake.
I am located in a lower hazard area, so I will be fine.	In lower hazard areas, infre	equent earthquakes can still c	ause strong shaking.
Damage to the building's structure is the most costly type of damage in earthquakes.	Most costs are typically from high-value components, and	n non-structural repairs, repla d lost revenue from business	cement of disruption.
I cannot afford to mitigate and prepare now.	Bracing and anchoring build tasks. There are programs of efforts. Taking action now c	ling contents can be part of re designed to partially subsidize an reduce damage and disrup	gular maintenance home mitigation tion later.
ARTHQUAKE HAZARD	CONSEQUENCES		
N CALIFORNIA	#Ťħ	- Frield	Ť
	FAMILY injury from falling items expensive repairs isolation and stress displacement	BUSINESS . loss of inventory . supply chain broken . loss of income . relocation	COMMUNITY . limited supplies & services . emergency services overloaded . fragmentation
	John Maria		
Higher Hazard	A MILLION AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AN	den .	



**PVRR: Preliminary Virtual Reconnaissance Report** *Building R esilience through Reconnaissance* 

and the

CALL

Life Safety Level of Damage for an Ordinary Building after a Large Earthquake

# THINGS YOU CAN DO

Preparedness will determine the quality of life in the weeks and months that follow a major earthquake.

#### FAMILY

- · Secure your space: brace and restrain heavy and important items such as water heaters and bookcases.
- In addition to a short-term emergency and communication plan, develop a longer-term recovery plan that includes personal and financial security.
- Assess age and earthquake safety of home. Consider retrofitting measures including chimney bracing.

#### RESOURCES

California Earthquake Authority – Residential Earthquake Insurance and Mitigation https://www.earthquakeauthority.com

"Homeowner's Guide to Earthquake Safety"

https://ssc.ca.gov/forms\_pubs/hog.html

"Staying Safe Where the Earth Shakes"

https://www.earthquakecountry.org/stayingsafe/

"MyHazards" Online Tool: Risks and Recommended Actions

http://myhazards.caloes.ca.gov/

#### BUSINESS

- Develop a short-term emergency plan as well as a longer-term continuity and recovery plan that includes employees, inventory, and financial security.
- Incorporate equipment and inventory restraint with operational maintenance plans.
- Confer with experts to identify risks and how to maintain operational functions by designing beyond the minimum code level.

#### RESOURCES

#### California Resilient Business Challenge

https://outsmartdisaster.com/be-resilient/at-work/resilient-business-challenge/

"Commercial Property Owner's Guide to Earthquake Safety"

- https://ssc.ca.gov/forms\_pubs/cog.html
- "7 Steps to an Earthquake Resilient Business"

https://www.earthquakecountry.org/library/7StepsBusiness2008.pdf

#### COMMUNITY

- Engage, inform, and train neighborhoods about mitigating the consequences of major earthquakes, including short-term emergency response and longer-term recovery measures.
- Determine which facilities are at risk and their impact on the public.
- For each public building, define its post-earthquake role in the community, complete a structural and non-structural assessment, and implement needed upgrades.

#### RESOURCES

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Earthquake Publications https://www.fema.gov/earthquake-publications "Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves - 2018 Interim Report" and Fact Sheets https://www.nibs.org/page/mitigationsaves

Expected Earthquaixe Performance of Buildings Designed to the California Building Code was instated and is published by the California Alfred E. Alquist Seismic Safety Commission", The guide was developed and prepared for publication by PEER - Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center, headquartered at the University of California, Berkeley.

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# Appendix B: EERI VERT Report





























### Summary of Aftershocks M6.4 Searles Valley Earthquake As of 07/05/2019 06:22 UTC, there have been 76 magnitude 3 or higher earthquakes, which are stope earthquakes, which are large enough to do damage. [1]

 According to our USGS forecast, over the next 1 Week there is a 3% chance of one or more aftershocks that are larger than magnitude 6.4. It is likely that there will be smaller earthquakes over the next 1 Week, with 57 to 110 magnitude 3 or higher aftershocks. [1]





M6.4 Searles Vall	ftershocks ey Earthqua	ake
pility of at least one aftershock of at least magnit	ude M within the giv	iven time frame.
arting 07/05/2019 06:30:00 UTC [1]		
Magnitude 1 Day 1 Week	Month 1 Year	
M>=3 >99% >99%	> 99% > 99%	
M>=5 26% 55%	72% 89%	
M>=6 3% 8%	12% 20%	
M>=7 < 1% < 1%	1% 2%	

Ť	M6	Sumn .4 Sea	nary of rles Va	Aftersh Iley Ear	thquake	
he likely <u>numbe</u> 7/05/2019 06:30	r of aftershock of a	t least maj	gnitude <mark>M</mark> w	ithin the giv	en time frame.	Forecast startin
	Magnitude	1 Day	1 Week	1 Month	1 Year	
	M >= 3	19 to 44	57 to 110	94 to 170	179 to 290	
	M >= 5	0 to 2	0 to 4	0 to 5	0 to 6	
	M >= 6	•	0 to 2	0 to 2	0 to 2	
	M >= 7				•	
Earthquake possi	ble but with a low pro	bability.				

Г











	5	Summ M	ary of 7.1 Ear	Afters thqua	hocks <b>ke</b>	
ability of a starting 07,	t least one aftersh /06/2019 15:00:00	DOCK of at OUTC [1]	least mag	nitude M w	ithin the giv	en time frame.
	Magnitude	1 Day	1 Week	1 Month	1 Year	
	M >= 3	> 99%	>99%	> 99%	>99%	
	M >= 5	71%	96%	>99%	>99%	
	M >= 6	12%	27%	40%	59%	
	M >= 7	1%	3%	5%	8%	

RĨ		5	ummar M7.1	Earthq	uake	
The likely nur	nber of after	ihock of at le	east magnitu	de M within	the given time fram	ne. Forecast starti
01/00/2015 1	5.00.00 010	.~/				
	Magnitude	1 Day	1 Week	1 Month	1 Year	
	M >= 3	91 to 170	57 to 110	94 to 170	690 to 1,200	
	M >= 5	0 to 4	0 to 8	2 to 11	4 to 6	
	M >= 6	0 to 2	0 to 2	0 to 3	0 to 4	
	M >= 7	•	•	0 to 2	0 to 3	
* Earthquake p	M >= 7	h a low proba	bility.	U to 2	0 to 3	







# FF Summary of Hospitals ional Ho July 4, 2019:

- Patients evacuated to be cautious [1]
   15 patients transferred to other hospitals while engineers repaired broken pipes [1]. At least five were helicoptered out [4]
   Patients sent to three hospitals (Bakersfield, Lancaster, Palm Field)
- Broken sprinklers at hospital [2]
- No structural damage to hospital
  No one was in surgery at the time of the quake. [4]

# FF Summary of Hospitals Bidgecrest Regional Hospital (RRH): July 5, 2019 • Due to aftershocks, Ridgecrest Regional Hospital is only providing ER services to locals in need, all other patients have been transferred out of the hospital [4]. • OsHPD inspected hospital and green tagged the hospital [4]. • OsHPD inspected hospital and green tagged the hospital. There was a water leak that caused closure of the hospital (reported during ERI Clearinghouse). • Emergency room remains closed, but emergency department is open for triage walk-in patients [3]. [3].

- [3].
   Hospital is encouraging anyone in active labor to still come to the hospital for delivery. They note that they have OBs and nurses on site and are confidently set-up for natural and c-section delivery [3].
   The following are closed until further notice: Urgent Care: Lab: Radiology: Dental; Rehab; Medical Records/ Hetah: Information Amagement (HMI); OPP (with the exception of patients scheduled for minor procedures and who have been notified) [3].





































































































	/16.4 Searles Valley Earthquake			
Lifeline	Status			
Electric power	<ol> <li>800 people without power in Trona [10]</li> <li>900 outages affecting tens of thousands of people as reported by Southern California Edison (<u>https://www.sce.com/outage-center/checkoutage-status</u>)</li> </ol>			
Gas	5 gas line breaks reported [3]			
Water	Water main break in San Bernardino county Water was out in Trona Co.			
Telecommunications/Internet	None			
Oil	N/A			
Airport	No damage to airports			
Port	N/A			
Public Transit	Metrolink shut down for inspections, resumed normal operation afterwards [11]			









#### EE RT

### Topic: Transportation Networks (including roads)

VERT Phase 1 Response for: Searles Valley M6.4 & M7.1 Earthquakes































# **F** RT

# **Topic: Emergency Response** VERT Phase 1 Response for: Searles Valley M6.4 & M7.1 Earthquakes














































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## About StEER

The National Science Foundation (NSF) awarded a 2-year EAGER grant (CMMI 1841667) to a consortium of universities to form the Structural Extreme Events Reconnaissance (StEER) Network. StEER's mission is to deepen the structural natural hazards engineering (NHE) community's capacity for reliable post-event reconnaissance by: (1) promoting community-driven standards, best practices, and training for RAPID field work; (2) coordinating official event responses in collaboration with other stakeholders and reconnaissance groups; and (3) representing structural engineering within the wider extreme events reconnaissance (EER) consortium in geotechnical engineering (GEER) and social sciences (SSEER) to foster greater potentials for truly interdisciplinary reconnaissance. StEER also works closely with the NSF-supported Natural Hazards Engineering Research Infrastructure (NHERI) RAPID facility and cyberinfrastructure Reconnaissance Portal to more effectively leverage these resources to benefit StEER missions.

StEER relies upon the engagement of the broad NHE community, including creating institutional linkages with dedicated liaisons to existing post-event communities and partnerships with other key stakeholders. While the network currently consists of the three primary nodes located at the University of Notre Dame (Coordinating Node), University of Florida (Atlantic/Gulf Regional Node), and University of California, Berkeley (Pacific Regional Node), StEER aspires to build a network of regional nodes worldwide to enable swift and high quality responses to major disasters globally.

StEER's founding organizational structure includes a governance layer comprised of core leadership with Associate Directors for the two primary hazards as well as cross-cutting areas of Assessment Technologies and Data Standards, led by the following individuals:

- **Tracy Kijewski-Correa (PI)**, University of Notre Dame, serves as StEER Director responsible with overseeing the design and operationalization of the network.
- Khalid Mosalam (co-PI), University of California, Berkeley, serves as StEER Associate Director for Seismic Hazards, leading StEER's Pacific Regional node and serving as primary liaison to the Earthquake Engineering community.
- **David O. Prevatt (co-PI)**, University of Florida, serves as StEER Associate Director for Wind Hazards, leading StEER's Atlantic/Gulf Regional node and serving as primary liaison to the Wind Engineering community.
- Ian Robertson (co-PI), University of Hawai'i at Manoa, serves as StEER Associate Director for Assessment Technologies, guiding StEER's development of a robust approach to damage assessment across the hazards.
- **David Roueche (co-PI)**, Auburn University, serves as StEER Associate Director for Data Standards, ensuring StEER processes deliver reliable and standardized reconnaissance data.

StEER's response to the 2019 Ridgecrest Earthquakes preceded the formation of its official policies, protocols and membership, which are still in active development. All policies, procedures and protocols described in this report should be considered preliminary and will be refined with community input as part of StEER's operationalization in 2019.

## StEER Event Report Library



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